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TRANSLATING THE IMMEASURABLE: THINKING
ABOUT PAIN AND SUFFERING COMPARATIVELY
Anthony J. Sebok*
INTRODUCTION
The Hague Conference's Draft Convention on the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters has been bounc-
ing back and forth between the United States and Europe since 1993,
and many in Europe are afraid that it will never be signed. To be sure,
some intellectual property issues have recently arisen that make nego-
tiations even more complicated, but I think it is safe to say that one
reason for the Convention's delay and likely future demise is that, at
the insistence of the Europeans, it guarantees that no nation will have
to enforce damages that are inconsistent with that nation's "public
policies."1 The Americans, on the other hand, refuse to agree to any
international convention that does not absolutely respect our unique
system of damages.2
This dispute may be another iteration of the globalization battle,
and European lawyers may want to limit the enforceability of Ameri-
can-style damages out of fear that successful enforcement of large
damage awards will encourage Europeans to forum shop in the
United States. 3 But I believe that we should take the Europeans' ar-
guments at face value. Lawyers from a wide range of perspectives, as
well as academics and public intellectuals, argue that the American
* Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (BLS). Ryan Micallef, BLS Class of
2007, and Ningur Akoglu, BLS Class of 2004, provided invaluable research assistance in the
preparation of this article. Completion of this article was made possible by a summer research
grant from Brooklyn Law School. Prepared for the Clifford Symposium, "Who Feels Their
Pain? The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil Litigation."
1. See Michael Traynor, An Introductory Framework for Analyzing the Proposed Hague Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: U.S. And Euro-
pean Perspectives, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 8 (2000).
2. American courts, however, generally decline to execute foreign judgments that contravene
domestic public policy. See Hilton v. Guyot, 59 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1895) (discussing the "comity
of nations," a doctrine that established the public policy requirements of enforcing foreign judg-
ments); see also Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440-43 (3d
Cir. 1971) (relying on the comity doctrine to find an English judgment enforceable).
3. See, e.g., Kurt Pelda, Siemens Faces Rail Fire Suit, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16,2001, at 7 (discussing
155 victims of fatal fire in Kaprun, Austria, many of whom sued Siemens and other German
defendants in New York federal court).
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approach is inconsistent with the traditions and mores of European
societies. These criticisms are, at their core, not too different (in form,
if not in substance) from the European rejection of capital punish-
ment. Furthermore, Europeans are more than mildly annoyed by the
fact that America seems unwilling to brook compromise when it
comes to the enforcement of American jury verdicts overseas.4
European disquiet with American damages comes in two flavors.
On the one hand, Europeans reject, out of hand, any form of punitive
damages. The reason for this rejection is rooted deep in the theoreti-
cal structure of civil law.5 On the other hand, it is clear that there is
also a deep distrust of our damages system overall. This second sort
of unease is less clearly stated, and many European lawyers would
have trouble expressing what, in particular, they find wrong. The gen-
eral drift of their complaints is manifested in expressions of incredu-
lity and skepticism about the frequency and size of American damage
awards. This is based on the impression that civil litigation has be-
come an increasingly important part of American culture, that private
litigation settles more questions (especially tort litigation), and that
the amounts awarded by juries are far larger than those awarded by
European courts.6
The European complaint has to meet two burdens if it is to be taken
seriously. First, there has to be some reason to believe that it is de-
scriptively true-that on some significant measure, American civil liti-
gation, especially tort litigation, behaves differently than its European
counterpart. And second, even if the first claim is true, there has to be
some reason why the difference should matter. The mere fact that
there may be a difference in the rate of growth of civil litigation (hold-
ing GDP and population growth constant) between the two systems
does not in itself say anything interesting; the same would be true if it
4. In 2003, Bertelsmann successfully argued to the German Constitutional Court that there
was a reasonable likelihood that it would be able to prove that allowing service of a class action,
which had been filed against it in the Southern District of New York, violated German public
policy. The only thing that distinguished this class action from others was the size of the potential
award-the plaintiffs were requesting damages of seventeen billion dollars. See Anthony J.
Sebok, Why The Latest Chapter In the Napster Saga Raises Issues About U.S./European Judicial
Cooperation, Nov. 17, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20031117.html.
5. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Rec-
ognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far (University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper
Series #26, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.con/pittwps/papers/art26.
6. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5 GER-
MAN L.J. No. 1413 (2004), available at www.germanlawjournal.com; Zurich Financial Services,
Industry Insight: The Threat of the Compensation Culture (April/May 2004), available at http://
www.zurich.com/main/productsandsolutions/industryinsight/2004 (providing links to several
short articles on the topic).
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were discovered that there was a difference between the total cost of
the two systems (again controlling for population and GDP) or be-
tween the size of awards. After all, there may be perfectly good rea-
sons, endogenous to the United States, for a more costly system or a
system in which the rate of suits filed increased over recent years.7 I
will discuss why I think the Europeans can overcome the first hurdle,
and then briefly discuss the challenges presented by the second
hurdle.
II. THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE INCREASE IN
TORT LITIGATION
First, it must be noted that any discussion about civil litigation in
America is treacherous because we have so little solid statistical data.
As Michael Saks famously noted in 1992, we do not know a lot about
the tort system in America.8 Data is collected only sporadically. The
Justice Department and the Rand Corporation do surveys, and almost
every state has a jury verdict reporter. But for all that, there is no
comprehensive, centralized device for collecting data about how often
lawsuits occur, who wins them, and what they get when they win.
Still, there are many partially comprehensive studies available, and
from those we can piece together certain generalizations. One thing
that can probably be said with some certainty is that the civil liability
system's importance, as measured by its influence on the U.S. econ-
omy, has grown in the postwar period. One credible study suggests
that the civil liability system was 0.6% of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in 1950 and over two percent of the GDP in 2002. 9 We also
know that, in specific areas of tort liability, the rate of claiming and
the amount of money received per claim has increased relative to in-
flation and population growth. Traffic accidents have declined signifi-
cantly since 1950, yet between 1977 and 1987 auto insurance payouts
7. The mere fact that there is an increase in activity in a certain area of the law during a
certain period of time is not a reason to conclude that there is too much litigation in that area of
law. Civil rights litigation certainly increased-measured in terms of absolute number of suits
and size of damage awards-between 1950 and 1975. I assume that no one today would argue
that the mere fact of an increase is prima facie evidence that civil rights litigation was "dysfunc-
tional" or "out of control."
8. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992).
9. Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, III INSURANCE ISSUES UPDATE (Apr. 2001). Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin reported that in 2002 tort costs were 2.2% of the GDP:
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increased by 140 percent. 10 Medical malpractice claiming rates have
gone up from 4.5 per 100 doctors in 1920 to 17.8 per 100 doctors in
1985.11 Between 1970 and 1985 the average claim payout in medical
malpractice (adjusted for inflation) increased from $37,000 to
$110,000.12 On the other hand, there is some evidence that the rate of
increase in the growth of tort liability flattened out by the 1990s. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Justice Survey, con-
ducted in 1992, 1996, and 2001, the total amount of money paid out in
tort judgments barely increased, relative to the growth in the nation's
population and economy.13
This is just a tiny slice of the numbers out there. One response to
these sorts of numbers is to try to explain away the increase in "claim-
ing and paying" by arguing that until we have all the facts (or at least a
lot more facts), we should refrain from forming any generalizations. It
seems that this skeptical response is often used to imply that because
we do not really know whether tort litigation expanded in the twenti-
eth century, it probably did not. This is a debate that I do not want to
reprise because I do not see why a defender of the tort system should
apologize for the expansion of the tort system.
Table 1: Tort Costs as a Percentage of GDP
U.S. Tort Costs U.S. GDP Tort Costs as % of
($ billions) ($ billions) GDP
1950 $ 1.8 $ 294 0.62%
1960 $ 5.4 $ 526 1.03%
1970 $ 13.9 $ 1,039 1.34%
1980 $ 42.7 $ 2,790 1.53%
1990 $ 130.2 $ 5,803 2.24%
2000 $ 179.2 $ 9,817 1.83%
2002 $ 233.2 $ 10,487 2.22%
2003 $ 245.7 $ 11,004 2.23%
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2004 Update, at 5 (2005), http://www.towersperrin.
com/tillinghast/publications/reports/Tort_2004/Tort.pdf.
10. DoN DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 15 (1996).
11. Id at 95.
12. Id. According to the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Justice Survey, the average medi-
cal malpractice award in 1992 in the nation's seventy-five largest counties was $1.48 million (the
median award was $201,000). CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 5 (1995).
13. In 1992, total tort judgments in the survey (which covers the nation's seventy-five largest
counties) was $1.869 billion, DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 12, at 5, in 1996 it was $2.099 billion,
CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 7 (1999), and in 2001 it was $2.299 billion. THOMAS H.
COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES, 2001, at 5 (2004). During this time the median award dropped from $50,000 in 1992,
DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 12, at 5, to $31,000 in 1996, DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra, at 7, to
$27,000 in 2001. COHEN & SMITH, supra, at 5.
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I want to proceed under the assumption that the rate and scale of
civil litigation have grown faster than the economy or population.
Taking this period of unusual growth as a given, I want to ask a differ-
ent question: how did this increase come about? My working hypoth-
esis is that the increase in the cost of the tort system can probably be
best explained by a significant increase in the rate of claiming and the
scale of payments for noneconomic damages.
Noneconomic damages might be best understood in contrast with
economic damages, which are those expenses that can be traced to a
loss with a market value. Medical expenses, lost wages, and lost prof-
its are economic losses. Noneconomic losses, on the other hand, refer
to those losses that have no easily calculable market value. This cate-
gory includes such diverse damages as compensation for physical pain,
mental suffering, disfigurement as a harm in itself, loss of bodily func-
tion, loss of enjoyment of life, and embarrassment. Noneconomic
losses do not include punitive damages, which are not compensatory
and hence fall in a separate category entirely. Although the specific
components have changed over the years, the concept of
noneconomic damages-which I shall refer to under the shorthand
"pain and suffering"-has been a part of the common law for a very
long time.
Although all three kinds of damages-economic, noneconomic, and
punitive-have grown in frequency and scale over the past fifty years,
I suspect that the growth in pain and suffering damages is unique.
Unlike punitive damages, which have almost certainly grown at an un-
usually fast rate in scale if not frequency, noneconomic damages affect
the civil liability system in a way that punitive damages do not. Puni-
tive damages make up such a small part of the total damages system
that even a five-fold increase in the total amounts paid out would still
constitute a very small part of the money paid between plaintiffs and
defendants. On the other hand, the amount of pain and suffering
damages currently paid out is almost at parity with economic dam-
ages. 14 That is to say, fifty percent of all tort damages currently paid
are for pain and suffering. This is a significant number. I wish that
there were historical studies that could provide a detailed comparison
with current figures, but there seem to be none. Nonetheless, my
sense is that noneconomic damages were not half of the total tort lia-
bility until sometime after 1960, and have gained prominence as the
14. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 777 (1995); see also
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-And-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995).
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result of three significant changes in the practice of tort law over the
past fifty years.' 5
Again, it may be the case that noneconomic damages have always
comprised at least half of the tort system's compensatory efforts, but I
doubt it. And I see no reason why a disproportionate increase in pain
and suffering damages compared to economic damages should be seen
as prima facie evidence of a problem with the American tort system.
Again, without knowing more about why noneconomic damages have
risen as quickly as they have, it would be just as presumptuous to take
their rapid rise as evidence of dysfunction as it would be to interpret
an absolute increase in the scale and frequency of the award of tort
damages overall (economic and noneconomic) as prima facie evidence
that the civil liability system was dysfunctional.
I can think of three reasons that, singly and in combination with
each other, could explain why noneconomic damages have risen faster
than economic damages. It is only after we tease out these reasons
and look at them in isolation that one can begin to determine whether
the degree to which pain and suffering damages have added to the
increase in noneconomic damages is a matter of regret.
First, there has been an increase in the set of noneconomic injuries
cognizable in tort. As one scholar put it, "[C]ourts during the last
twenty-five years have expanded significantly the circumstances in
which they will award damages for emotional distress.' 1 6 Every torts
teacher knows about the evolution of the claim for emotional distress
without impact. It was a slow march to get from a state of affairs in
which no noneconomic damages were possible without physical im-
pact, to one where there is active debate over whether the bystander
test might be satisfied by a parent who did not witness her child being
injured in utero but did witness the consequences of the injury upon
the child's birth.17 Courts have expanded the right to noneconomic
damages through extending the loss of consortium to women, creating
a new interest in the "enjoyment of life" (separate from pain and suf-
fering and thus available to the comatose), 18 and allowing for pain and
suffering in bad faith breaches of insurance contracts (creating a claim
for noneconomic damages in tort in what was once seen as an area of
15. Deborah Hensler, of RAND and Stanford Law School, has confirmed to me in a personal
communication that, in her opinion, there are no existing historical comparisons between the
rate of growth of economic and noneconomic damages.
16. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772,
814 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 480-81 (Kan. 1990).
18. See generally John Dwight Ingram, Damages for Loss of the Enjoyment of Life, 24 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 423 (1991).
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contract law). 19 Thus, we can say that the frequency of noneconomic
damages may have increased relative to economic damages because
the grounds for claiming have expanded.
Second, there has been an increase, in absolute amounts, of the ac-
tual payout per average noneconomic award. This is a difficult claim
to prove in any detail because certain grounds for liability for
noneconomic awards simply did not exist until recently. But certain
noneconomic damages have been around for a long time, and when
we compare their change over time, we see-to put it bluntly-that
pain is worth more now than it was forty years ago (even adjusted for
inflation). Take for example the average award for pain and suffering
experienced before death. Adjusted for inflation, the average amount
awarded between 1980 and 1987 was $147,000, while the average
awarded between 1960 and 1969 was $48,000-an increase of almost
300 percent. 20 Evidence from Patricia Danzon suggests that pain and
suffering awards in medical malpractice verdicts have experienced
similar increases. 21 Thus, we can say that the scale of noneconomic
damages may have increased relative to economic damages because
the quantum of compensation for whatever is supposed to be compen-
sated (pain, suffering, embarrassment, etc.) has increased compared to
the cost of labor or medical care.
Third, there has probably been an increase, in absolute amounts, in
the number of people claiming in tort for noneconomic damages, re-
gardless of whether they are claiming under a new or more traditional
cause of action. That is to say, as Rustad and Koenig have pointed
out, noneconomic damages seem to have a gendered quality to them.
Women's claims in medical malpractice are two times more likely to
produce an award for noneconomic damages than are similar claims
by men.2 2 As Rustad observed:
The explanation for the disproportionate number of noneconomic
damage awards for women lies in the gendered nature of inju-
ries .... [N]early nine out of [every] ten victims of sexual abuse by
medical providers were female. In most of these sexual abuse cases,
the only compensable injury was emotional pain and suffering....
[E]lderly women in nursing home cases and housewives in cosmetic
19. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
20. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 345 (1989).
21. PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY 152-58 (1985).
22. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise,
70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
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surgery malpractice cases generally receive only noneconomic dam-
ages because they have no present or future earnings to lose.2 3
In the past thirty years more women, minorities, and working-class
people have been brought into the tort system through the activities of
an innovative plaintiffs' bar and changes in civil procedure. In some
cases, as with women, the effect of the change in the mix of plaintiffs
in tort litigation would be to clearly shift the balance of damages fur-
ther to the noneconomic side of the ledger. In the case of the entry of
other excluded people, such as male minority or working-class plain-
tiffs, it is not obvious why their entry into the tort claiming class would
necessarily make noneconomic damages rise faster than economic
damages. It would explain, however, why tort damages overall have
increased more than one might otherwise expect. On the other hand,
if, as I suggested earlier, more people were entering the tort claiming
class at the same time that the types of tort damages were expanding
rapidly in the area of noneconomic damages and the price of pain per
unit was rising faster than the cost of wages or medical care, then even
these additional male plaintiffs would have helped grow noneconomic
damages at a rate faster than economic damages. Thus, we can say
that the frequency of noneconomic damages may have increased rela-
tive to economic damages because the population of claims for
noneconomic damages increased compared to the population of
claims for the value of lost wages or medical expenses.
III. AN INCREASE COMPARED TO WHAT?
One of the most common assumptions made by Americans about
the European tort system is that it is less "plaintiff-friendly" because it
does not allow as many types of claims for noneconomic damages as
the American system (or the common law). For example, Business
Week recently published a cover story on tort reform that drew a vari-
ety of contrasts between the European and American civil liability
systems.24 The article's premise was that tort law plays a much
smaller role in the regulation of corporate misconduct in Europe than
in the United States. Some of the reasons the article cited-such as
the relatively stronger role played by the regulatory state-are proba-
bly correct. But some of the article's assertions repeat common myths
about European tort law. The article contrasts the availability of
23. Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Col-
lar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 749 (1996).
24. Mike France, How to Fix the Tort System, Bus. WK., Mar. 14, 2005, at 70 ("Western
Europeans smoke, take Vioxx, and buy Firestone tires, too. But when they get injured, claims
are handled far differently.").
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"emotional damages" in the United States and Europe by stating that
in Europe, "[p]ayments for emotional distress [are] restricted. '2 5 The
article further contrasts the way in which damages are awarded by
stating that in Europe, "[p]ayment rulings [are] made by administra-
tive judges with fee schedules. '26
As we shall see below, most Western European nations allow the
recovery of emotional distress damages, which look very similar to the
broad bases of recovery that characterize the American system. Fur-
thermore, although it is certainly true that lay juries are hardly used in
any European civil justice system (including the United Kingdom27),
the blanket assertion that judges are guided by schedules in Europe
mischaracterizes a much more complex reality. This point will be ex-
plored in greater detail below.
A. The Real World of the Law of European Emotional Distress
Like the United States, the United Kingdom and the nations of
Western Europe have experienced a gradual change in the number of
"headings" under which victims of civil harms could bring claims for
compensation. While each national legal system followed its own
unique path, the general trend since the Second World War has been
to liberalize the availability of emotional distress, whether by law re-
form or through interpretation of existing code provisions. For exam-
ple, the Italian heading of danno alla salute, which roughly
corresponds to injuries to the health of the body, was once measured
almost entirely by the impairment of the victim's ability to work.28
This resulted in decisions such as one from 1967 that awarded no dam-
ages to a severely disabled elderly person because according to the
court, "people without any value can exist, as in the case of those who,
because of old age, are absolutely not fitted to any earning producing
activity. '29 According to modern commentary, the decision was prob-
ably correct for its time, but would be viewed as "outrageous" by Ital-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Unlike England, Northern Ireland and Scotland have retained juries in a small number of
tort cases. It is also not clear that judges handle issues of damages that differently from juries in
the United States. See generally Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Dam-
ages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
28. F. D. Busnelli & G. Comand6, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under Italian Law, in DAMAGES FOR
NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135, 138 (W. V. Horton Rogers ed.,
2001).
29. Id. at 142 (quoting Tribunale di Firenze from Jan. 6, 1967).
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ian lawyers today. 30 Similar changes have occurred in Germany as
well. 31
Familiar theories of liability, which are conventionally viewed as
part of the "torts explosion" in the United States, include recovery for
pure emotional distress caused by injury to another, 32 pre-impact fear
before death,33 or loss of enjoyment of life. 34 While there may be de-
bate at the margins of these doctrines, the most significant feature of
the modern European doctrine is not only that it has changed almost
as rapidly as the American doctrine, but that in many ways it is far
more pro plaintiff than American law in its characterization of the
grounds of recovery for nonpecuniary losses. The "functional" ap-
proach to damages for injury to the person, by which damages are
awarded to help the victim purchase "substitute sources of satisfaction
for those he has lost" is looked upon with increasing suspicion by Eu-
ropean courts and scholars. 35 An increasingly more popular alterna-
tive is to treat nonpecuniary injuries as injuries to the personality, as
in the French or German model. Under this approach, the injury has
an objective value for which compensation must be paid, regardless of
whether the victim can or would use the money to alleviate past or
future suffering.36
B. The Real World of Damages Scheduling in Europe
In almost no Western European system does the legislature set
damages for pain and suffering. 37 There are a variety of methods that
European judges use to determine damages other than the presenta-
tion of testimony at trial.
30. See id.
31. See Ulrich Magnus & Jorg Fedtke, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under German Law, in DAMAGES
FOR NoN-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 28, at 109, 119 (citing
Lemcke-Schmalzl/Schmalzl on the "significant increase" in damages for personal injury in Ger-
many between 1950-1980).
32. See, e.g., Suzanne Garland-Carval, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under French Law, in DAMAGES
FOR NoN-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 28, at 87, 91 (explain-
ing that relatives may claim "moral suffering").
33. See Busnelli & Comandd, supra note 28, at 143; Magnus & Fedtke, supra note 31, at 114.
34. See Giovanni Comand6, Non-Pecuniary Damages for Personal Injury in Europe and the
US: A Proposal for Judicial Scheduling Models (unpublished article, on file with author).
35. W. V. H. Rogers, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under English Law, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECU-
NIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 28, at 54, 59-60.
36. See Garland-Carval, supra note 32, at 95 (on the "objective analysis of dommage moral").
37. Spain sets damages for road accidents by a legislative schedule. Otherwise, "[t]he most
common wording used by Spanish Courts in the assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss is
that it has to be done 'according to the circumstances of the case ....' Miquel Martin-Casals et
al., Non-Pecuniary Loss Under Spanish Law, in DAMAGES FOR NoN-PECUNIARY Loss IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 28, at 192, 209.
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In England, courts refer to "brackets"-ranges of amounts for dif-
ferent headings of damages. 38 An independent body called the Judi-
cial Studies Board sets these brackets.39 It is up to the individual trial
judge and the courts of appeals to place the victims' injuries within the
range of the appropriate bracket.40 In Germany, there is no official
body setting out brackets or ranges, but private groups such as
ADAC, the German equivalent of the American Automobile Associa-
tion, publish biannual summaries (Tabellen) of a large number of re-
ported personal injury awards in Germany, with brief summaries of
the injuries found and damages awarded by the court. Both France
and Italy have used two methods to achieve standardization. 41 First,
both nations' courts require parties to present their claims for pain
and suffering in terms of a standardized "point system. '42 The scales
used by the parties before the court are based on expert opinions from
medical scientists and psychologists and form a standard by which the
severity of an impairment can be measured. 43 In addition, in France
the monetary value attached to this point system is collected nation-
ally and used by courts to achieve some modicum of national horizon-
tal equity.44 In Italy the collection of data is done regionally and there
is an effort to achieve horizontal equity at the local or regional level.45
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN
SYSTEMS FOR THE COMPENSATION OF PAIN AND
SUFFERING: ABSOLUTE DAMAGES
Assuming that the United States has a system of compensation for
pain and suffering that is different in some significant way from the
European approach, and assuming that the legal doctrines that com-
prise the two systems allow for roughly similar headings of damages
for nonpecuniary loss or emotional distress, what could account for
the difference?
One possibility is that the number of persons claiming in European
systems is significantly smaller (relative to population and GDP) than
in the United States. One might be able to get a rough sense of the
difference in- rates of suing by looking at the number of tort claims
38. BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN ENGLISH, GERMAN
AND ITALIAN LAW 16 (2005).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 17-18 & n.39.
42. See Comand6, supra note 34, at 54-56.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 38, at 19.
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filed per capita in the United States and Europe. If it were the case
that there was less tort litigation in Europe than in the United States,
this might be a result of a number of factors.
It might be the case that because of a stronger social safety net,
injured Europeans have less incentive to sue to recover medical ex-
penses and lost wages, thus reducing the opportunity to sue for other
compensable injuries, such as pain and suffering. Furthermore, it
might be the case that the "loser-pays" rule, which is dominant in Eu-
rope, and the absence of a contingency fee, which does not exist in
Europe except to a very minor degree in England, also create disin-
centives to sue. Finally, it might be the case that there are fewer inju-
ries in Europe, all things considered, leading to a naturally smaller
population of victims who could consider suing. These are all factors
that need to be addressed, and yet fall outside the scope of this paper.
Another factor that could account for the difference is the size of
pain and suffering awards themselves. Even if the right to redress for
the invasion of a nonpecuniary interest was roughly the same between
the United States and Europe, and even if roughly the same propor-
tion of injured persons sued for their injuries, the systems might look
very different-at least in terms of the costs they impose on their soci-
eties-if the amount of damages awarded for similar injuries were
very different.
To investigate this possibility I attempted a rough comparison be-
tween the German awards recorded in the Tabellen 46 and American
awards obtained from case evaluation software supplied by a private
reporting company, Jury Verdict Research (JVR). JVR maintains a
database of over 200,000 American tort case outcomes. JVR works
with these cases to provide case evaluation services to attorneys. For
example, an attorney might use JVR's software to determine the ap-
proximate value of a plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against a
hospital by entering specific facts of the plaintiff's case into the
software. The software then calculates an estimate of the value of that
claim based on the type and extent of the injury, information about
the plaintiff and defendant, and other factors.
I have also provided a comparison of German awards within the
universe of European awards based on a survey conducted by the Eu-
ropean Center of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL). I call this survey,
46. ALLGEMEINER DEUTSCHER AUTOMOBIL-CLUB (ADAC), SCHMERZENSGELD-BETRAGE
(Susanne Hacks et al. eds, 20th ed. 2001) [hereinafter TABELLEN] (containing awards granted by
German courts between 1988 and 2001).
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which was published in 2001, the "Rogers survey. '47 The statistics
provided by the Rogers survey are much rougher than those gener-
ated by the Tabellen-JVR analysis. They are provided to illustrate
where, in general, Germany falls within the range of European dam-
ages for nonpecuniary loss.
The comparison of New York and German damages was made by
sampling cases from one volume of the Tabellen.4 8 Specifically, the
edition used indexed awards by injury type, among other methods.
The cases selected from the Tabellen were cases including cervical
spine injuries. These cases were selected both because they are nu-
merous and because they are better suited to research into pain and
suffering damages than other types of injuries. The Tabellen lists over
420 cervical spine injury cases. 49
One limitation of using the Tabellen is that while it is quite detailed
about the nature and cause of an injury, it does not separate pecuniary
from nonpecuniary damages. But because a very large portion of
medical expenses are not recovered in tort litigation in Germany (be-
cause they are paid by the state), the real risk in using the Tabellen is
that other economic losses, especially relating to lost earnings (past
and future), will be contained in the damage awards, thus overstating
the basis for comparison. Two comments can be made about this.
First, because of the availability of unemployment and disability pay-
ments from the state, lost earnings do not necessarily comprise a large
portion of damage awards for cervical injury in Germany as compared
to the amount awarded for pain and suffering (Schmerzensgeld). Sec-
ond, to the extent that I am wrong about the first point, this would
only lead to an understatement of the difference between American
and German pain and suffering awards in cervical injuries, and, as we
will see below, the difference is significant even if the figures in the
Tabellen unrealistically attribute one hundred percent of the damages
to pain and suffering.
A sample group of forty-two cases was selected from the Tabellen,
with every tenth case chosen to help randomize the sample. For com-
parison to these German awards, reports were selected from the
Westlaw combined database of verdict reports. These cases were lim-
ited to reports between 1988 and 2001 (to match the dates of the
Tabellen results) and were also limited to New York State (to match,
roughly, the number of results in the Tabellen, allowing easier, ran-
47. See DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note
28.




dom selection). The Westlaw search returned 309 reports. Of these
reports, forty-two cases were selected that matched the following cri-
teria: plaintiff verdicts and settlements in which pain and suffering
damages were identified specifically. Further, only the pain and suf-
fering portions of the overall awards were used for comparison. This
last restriction will have the effect of minimizing the size of New York
damages (thus minimizing their ratios to the German damages).
The New York awards were not adjusted for inflation, while the
awards in the Tabellen were adjusted. The lack of inflation adjustment
here will tend to understate the New York awards. Medians were
taken across the forty-two samples; these medians were compared to
provide a ratio. The forty-two samples in both sets were divided into
quintiles and the medians were taken of each of the quintiles to pro-
vide a set of five ratios (the top New York quintile to the top German
quintile, and so on).
The numerical comparisons made here are intended to be rough
estimates only. There are several known infirmities (and doubtless
several others which remain unknown) in the methods used to gather
and compare this information. Among these are sample selection dif-
ficulties, differing judicial and medical systems across jurisdictions, in-
flation, and currency conversion. Nonetheless, the comparisons show
that American awards are significantly larger than European awards,
justifying further investigation using more refined methods.
As the first chart in the Appendix shows, the ratios between the
German and American pain and suffering awards are enormous. In
the case of back injury, Germans received a median award of approxi-
mately C1,175 ($1,382) while JVR reported a median pain and suffer-
ing award of C80,750 ($94,447).50
When compared with the cross-national survey of pain and suffer-
ing awards presented in the Rogers survey, Germany seems to fall in
the middle of the group. Therefore, one could make a very rough
guess that the cervical injury ratios between the German cases and the
New York cases indicate that, overall, the quantum of money paid for
pain and suffering for similar wrongs in Europe and the United States
differs by a factor of at least 10:1 if not more (the German-NY ratios
ranged between 28:1 to 68:1).
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES DIFFERENCE MAKE?
The first reaction one might have to this report is that either Ameri-
can pain and suffering damages are too high or that European pain
50. For the raw data and the list of all the selected cases (without narrative detail), see app. II.
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and suffering damages are too low. The former position has been em-
braced, obviously, by those who want to cap pain and suffering dam-
ages in the United States.51 The latter position has been embraced
(perhaps less obviously) in Europe. In 1996, for example, the Law
Commission in England concluded that "current awards for non-pecu-
niary loss for serious personal injury were substantially below the
level that they should be, in light of prevailing social, economic and
industrial conditions. '52 It recommended that the awards be in-
creased by a multiplier of at least 1.5 or 2.0.53 In 1992 the Austrian
government criticized pain and suffering awards as too low and rec-
ommended that parliament raise them.54 German academic commen-
tary, some of which has the same status as a pronouncement from the
American Law Institute, has also criticized pain and suffering dam-
ages for serious injuries as inadequate. 55
The differences between systems should not matter, even if they are
quite large, unless the two systems are attempting to secure the same
thing through compensation for nonpecuniary loss. This is especially
true if all the systems adopted the functional approach to compensa-
tion for pain and suffering. The cost of living in the various nations
under consideration is not so different that the buying power of a dol-
lar or a Euro can explain the sort of differences that were identified
above.
In order to determine whether the difference identified is impor-
tant, therefore, we would need to collect and then compare theories of
compensation that justify monetary damages for nonpecuniary harms.
As a preliminary matter, three general theories can be identified. The
first is the functional approach, discussed briefly in the above text.
According to this theory, the point of damages is to replace the loss
suffered by the victim, however the loss was occasioned. A key as-
sumption of this theory is that damages for pain and suffering can do
the same work as damages for medical expenses or lost wages. 56 The
51. For a discussion of recent efforts to cap noneconomic damages, see Catherine M. Sharkey,
Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005).
52. Heil v. Rankin, [2001] Q.B. 272 (concluding that nonpecuniary damages in six of eight
cases under appeal should be raised).
53. Id. at 288.
54. Ernst Karner & Helmut Koziol, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under Austrian Law, in DAMAGES
FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 28, at 1, 14.
55. Magnus & Fedtke, supra note 31, at 115.
56. As John Golberg and Benjamin Zipursky explain, functionalist American tort theorists
like William Prosser held that "[i]nsofar as tort law is concerned, there is no essential difference
between traumatic physical injury, illness, or psychic distress. Simply put, harm is harm is




second is the deterrence approach, specifically the theory of measur-
ing pain and suffering damages proposed by Mark Geistfeld and
others. 57 Under the deterrence approach, the main purpose of secur-
ing damages on behalf of a victim is instrumental. The transfer of the
damages is not expected to make the victim any worse off than he or
she had been before the accident; it is expected to reflect how much
the victim, and hence the tortfeasor, would have valued the avoidance
of the risk that resulted in the injury.58 The third theory, which I have
called the objective approach, views the diminution of quality of life
as a wrong in itself, which creates an obligation to repair for the
tortfeasors. The objective approach rejects the idea that damages can
repair certain kinds of hedonic and dignitary losses, and it rejects the
view that the only point of assessing damages is to instrumentalize
deterrence. 59
I suspect that the modern trend in Europe has been towards a blend
of the functional and objective approaches, while the modern ap-
proach in the United States has been a blend of the functional and
deterrence approaches. If I am correct that the best characterization
of the modern approach in Europe towards nonpecuniary damages is
a blend of the functional and objective approaches, and the trend in
the United States has been towards blending the functional and deter-
rence approaches, then we may be able to explain part of the gap in
the amounts awarded for the same injuries between the two systems.
The next generation of comparative scholarship on damages will
have to go beyond comparing the amount of damages received on ei-
ther side of the Atlantic and will have to compare the theories that
generate these amounts. This will require a kind of translation that
goes beyond interpreting the different words or mechanisms used by
private law systems in different countries. It will involve translation
across philosophical or conceptual structures. This is a very hard task
because it requires a fair bit of conceptual analysis, as William Ewald
noted in his famous essay on comparative law, What Was it Like to Try
a Rat?60 It is, however, an important step in the development of a
57. See Geistfeld, supra note 14. See also Croley & Hanson, supra note 14.
58. See Geistfeld, supra note 14, at 805-07.
59. See MARGARET J. RADIN. CONTESTED COMMODITIES 80-101 (1996); Andrew J. McClurg,
Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 35-37 (2005).
60. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was It Like To Try a Rat?, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995).
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theory of comparative damages that will provide lawyers in the
United States with the requisite knowledge that will help them under-
stand not only European noneconomic damage awards, but also the
noneconomic awards arising in their own jurisdictions.
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4th Quintile Median 5th Quintile Median
TABELLEN V. JVR: COMPARISON OF SELECTED CERVICAL SPINE INJURIES
German Awards New York Awards Ratio
Overall Average C 3,777 C 214,855 56.9
Overall Median C 1,175 C 80,750 68.7
1st Quintile Median C 350 C 9,775 27.9
2nd Quintile Median C 750 C 21,250 28.3
3rd Quintile Median C 1,175 C 80,750 68.7
4th Quintile Median C 2,125 C 136,000 64.0
5th Quintile Median C 8,750 C 550,800 62.9
MEDIAN AWARD RATIOS BY QUINTILE

























Quadri- Blind- Taste & Non-dom Tibia Facial Sexual Sterility Sterility
plegia ness smell hand fracture scars function(m) (f 18) (m 40) PTSD
Austria C 110K C 100K C 10K C 8K C 6K C 47K C 70K C 15K
Belgium C 181 C 80 C8 C 13 C31 C6 C25
England C 297 C 215 C32 C81 C7 C42 C 127 C 122 C 13 C 52
France C 270 C 227 C2 C25 C76 C76 C23
GermanyC 188 C 163 C30 C30 C3 C9 C45 C30 C 24 C 150
Italy C 390 C 372 C 9 C 134 C2 C40 C 115 C39 C 21
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